Organizational economics has advanced along two parallel tracks, one concerned with motivating agents with diverging objectives, the other -less developed -with coordinating agents under cognitive limits. This survey focuses on the second strand and attempts to bring the two strands together. Organizations are viewed as responses to the cognitive costs faced by their (potential) members. We review existing approaches such as team theory, hierarchies of processors, organizational languages and knowledge hierarchies and we argue that they can help us address an array of important organizational issues. We also review recent developments in the application of these ideas: exploiting complexity measures, combining team theory and contract theory, applying organization theories in labor economics, and using these theories to interpret the wealth of activity data that is becoming available.
Introduction
Organizations are formed by agents working together for a common purpose. Two sets of obstacles may prevent organizations from reaching their goals. First, incentive problems: achieving a common goal may be di¢ cult because individual pursue di¤erent objectives.
Second, even when all agents share a common purpose, they face coordination problems due to cognitive costs. They must exchange information, coordinate their actions, and make joint decisions. Such activities require talking, writing, reading, and thinking -all tasks that require time and energy.
On the …rst set of problems, starting with the work of Leo Hurwicz (1973) and Theodore Groves (1973) , mechanism design and contract theory have made huge progress. Contracts are designed, under asymmetric information, so that principals can motivate their agents in order to align their individual goals with those of the organization. The typical contracttheoretic contribution strives to …nd the optimal contract, holding constant the role of the agent in the organization and the informational environment. For instance, in the classical moral hazard problem, the set of possible actions that the agent can take is given and so is the information that the agent and the principal observe; moreover, the relation between agents is also exogenously given. This corresponds to assuming an exogenous solution to the second problem discussed above.
However, in practice organizations can choose, at least partly, how to allocate tasks to agents, what monitoring systems to put in place and what channels of communication to establish. In a world with cognitive limits, these organizational choices come at a cost. Designing the organization requires choosing between alternative structures given the cognitive limits of its agents (or the agents that could be hired). 1 Economists have been aware of the importance of bounded rationality for the study of organizations for a long time. Simon (1947) and March and Simon (1958) advocated studying "the motivational, con ‡ict of interest, cognitive and computational constraints that human beings place on organizations." In particular they emphasized the importance of the role of individual cognition in understanding organizations and "the constraints placed on the human being by his limitations as a complex information-processing system." In Simon's view, "organization members are decision makers and problem solvers and [...] perception and thought processes are central to the explanation of behavior in organizations" (March and Simon, 1958, p 25) . Arrow (1974) is a manifesto for a theory of organizations built on bounded rationality.
He argues that since individuals are boundedly rational, an organization can acquire more information than any individual, and thus an organization is useful for information handling.
In particular, he highlights two advantages of organizations: …rst, since communication channels must be designed, organizations can choose a specialized code for e¢ ciency; second, since joint production is preferred, but exchanging information is costly, authority is useful because it economizes on information costs.
The goal of this survey is to review the economic literature on organizational responses to bounded rationality. We include contributions that satisfy three criteria: (i) Cognitive limits are part of the model (e.g. agents face a cost of communication); (ii) They deal with issues of interest to organizational economists, such as task allocation or the creation of organizational languages; (iii) The structure of the organization is, at least to a certain extent, chosen in response to the cognitive limits of its members (e.g. tasks are allocated to reduce the need for communication).
On the methodological side, we are inspired by Herbert Simon's emphasis on being explicit about cognitive assumptions. We categorize the existing literature on the basis of the constraints that makes coordination costly or impossible.
In section 2 we begin with the model that has guided scholars in this area since the 50s: team theory. Team theory studies multi-agent problems where agents share the same goal but may have asymmetric information. After a short presentation of the theory, we review a number of applications, which shed light on important organizational phenomena.
The material is structured around substantive questions such as "How should functions be grouped into divisions?" or "Should teams be homogenous?"
Team theory supplies a set of powerful tools to characterize the bene…ts of di¤erent information structures. We can, for instance, ask whether the organization is better o¤ if a particular agent receives information from a certain source or from a di¤erent source. However, team theory is silent on the cost of di¤erent information structures. Hence, it is usually complemented by ad hoc assumptions on the cost and feasibility of di¤erent information structures.
Since the 90s, a small but growing number of scholars have been exploring the cost side as well. The approach, which we review in section 3, consists in modeling a particular form of cognitive cost in detail and studying how organizations would structure themselves in response to this cost factor. We identify three sets of models, according to whether the cognitive limit concerns the variable cost of information processing and communication, the …xed cost of communication, and the cost of knowledge. The three cognitive costs give rise respectively to three sets of models: hierarchies of processors (Radner 1993, Bolton and Dewatripont 1994) , organizational languages (Crémer, Garicano and Prat 2007) , and knowledge hierarchies (Garicano 2000) . Section 4 discusses recent e¤orts by scholars to incorporate both incentive and cognitive considerations in the design of …rm's organizations. It reviews a number of papers that combine team theory and contract theory to draw important lessons on the interaction between incentive structures and coordination mechanisms.
Section 5 reviews some current developments of the literature. First, at a foundational level, there are attempts to use complexity notions to microfound cognitive costs. As computer scientists have developed a sophisticated body of knowledge on complexity, such a linkage would provide powerful foundations to organization theory. Second, a stream of research looks at the interaction between the labor market and the internal organization of …rms that have resulted from advances in information and communication technology and in the international division of labor. Third, organization theories based on cognitive costs yield testable implications in terms of how agents allocate their time to di¤erent tasks. Thanks to electronic records, activity data is becoming more readily available and provides organizational economists with a chance to use the intellectual framework they have been developing to understand how organizations work in practice.
Team Theory
Team theory is a powerful and general tool for economists working on organizations. It represents the natural extension of single-agent decision making under uncertainty to multiple agents. Agents share the same objective but they observe di¤erent signals. When they make decisions, they have only partial information on what their team members have observed. In our categorization, team theory relates to limits to communication. Implicitly, agents have di¤erent information sets because they cannot fully communicate with each other.
Team theory was developed starting in the 50s by Jacob Marschak and Roy Radner (see Marschak and Radner 1972 for the most complete treatment). Later, it was somewhat neglected as the interest of the profession shifted to noncooperative games. However, in recent years economists have used team theory to derive a number of insights in organization economics. Moreover, some team-theoretic techniques have been increasingly applied to game-theoretic problems.
The general lesson that emerges from the team theory literature is that there are important strategic complementarities between the information structure of a …rm and other organizational variables such as decision rules, workforce characteristics, delegation, and task specialization. Team theory allows us to make a rich set of predictions about these complementarities.
Decision-making in teams: Basic framework
Let X be the set of possible states of the world with an associated probability distribution . Let A i be the set of actions available to team member i. The team payo¤ is ! (x; a 1 ; : : : ; a n ) where x is the realized state and a i is the action chosen by member i. Implicit in this set-up is the assumption that team members pursue the same objective, namely the maximization of the expected value of the payo¤ !.
Typically, agents do not observe the state of the world directly. Let
be the signal that i receives when the state of the world is x. The function i is i's information structure. Member i makes a decision based on his own signal realization
The function i is i's decision rule. Given an information function and a decision rule for every agent, the team's expected payo¤ is
With these concepts in mind, it is easy to see the role of team theory within organization economics. The typical way of proceeding is to …x the information structure of agents and to determine the optimal decision rule together with the maximum payo¤ ( ) = arg max ( ; ) :
The optimized payo¤s can then be used to compare di¤erent information structures. If we wish to determine whether information structure 00 is better than information structure 0 we just need to compare^ ( 00 ) to^ ( 0 ). One can also imagine that the two information structures have di¤erent costs c ( 0 ) and c ( 00 ), in which case the correct comparison will bê
Team theory was developed before Harsanyi's analysis of games of incomplete information.
We can now view the set-up just described as a special case of a static game of incomplete -one where all agents have the same payo¤ function !. The information structures are common knowledge and y i is the type of player i. Decision rules are interpreted as strategies.
The commonality of interest among players implies two results that are not typically true in game-theoretic settings. First, an increase in the accuracy of the information (in a Blackwell sense) that a certain agent i receives cannot decrease the expected payo¤. This is immediate because the agent could still use the same decision function he used before, so he would not move to a new decision function if it yields a lower expected payo¤ for the team.
Second, a necessary condition for the payo¤ to be maximized for all members is that it is maximized for each member individually. For every i, holding …xed the 's of the other members at the optimal level , it must be true that ( ) = arg max i ( 1 ; : : : ; i ; : : : ; n ; ) :
This fact, labelled by Marschak and Radner as person-by-person optimality, is not necessarily true in general games, where Pareto-e¢ cient outcomes need not be supported by Nash equilibria. If the payo¤ function is concave and di¤erentiable in actions, then person-by-person optimality is both necessary and su¢ cient for optimality -a fact that greatly simpli…es the search for the optimal decision rule.
For economists interested in organizations, team theory has at the same time a great strength and a great weakness.
The strength of team theory has to do with the generality of the approach, which can accommodate an enormous variety of information structures. To illustrate this point, let us consider management by exception, namely the idea that workers act independently in normal situations while they call an emergency meeting whenever one of them observes something abnormal. Management by exception can be modelled in a simple way within team theory.
Let i denote the information structure of member i if he acts independently and let R i be the set of emergency signals. Then, we can write the …nal information structure of member i as follows
2 R j for all j = 1; : : : ; n j (x) j=1;:::;n if j (x) 2 R j for at least one j = 1; : : : ; n One can then assume that holding an emergency conference has a …xed cost F and can determine the optimal set of 'exceptional'signals (Marschak and Radner 1972, Chapter 6).
In fact, team theory can even be extended beyond the one-shot environment described above. Marschak and Radner (1973, Chapters 7 and 8) . For instance, we can examine communication protocols whereby Agent 1 passes a possibly imperfect signal to Agent 2, who combines it with his own signal and passes it to 3, and so on.
The main weakness of team theory is related to its strength. It allows comparison of the bene…ts of a wide range of information structures, but it says nothing about their cost or feasibility, which are determined outside the model. Hence, we are left with a large number of potential solutions. Team theory must be complemented by assumptions based on the observation of real organizations if we want to derive precise predictions.
Applications of Team Theory
There are a number of team-theoretic contributions that yield important insights for organizational economists. Here we review some of these results with the objective of illustrating the empirical implications that the analysis yields, and which, in our view, serve to illuminate questions on which more motivation/incentive based models have been silent. Question 1. How should functions be grouped? Crémer (1980) asks how functions within a …rm should be optimally grouped into divisions. He considers a …rm composed of many basic units, each of which is subject to some source of uncertainty which it observes.
Speci…cally, suppose that x ik is the production by unit i of good or service k, k = 1; 2; :::; m, and C i (x i ) the cost of producing the vector x i = (x i1 ; :::x im ): for each good k, total production must equal demand x d k . Letting x be the production matrix of all units, the full-information problem is simply:
Suppose, however, that each unit is subject to cost uncertainty. Units must be organized in division. A division observes the shocks that a¤ect its units but not the units belonging to other divisions. Equivalently, transfers between divisions are set before uncertainty is realized, while intra-divisions transfers take place after the resolution of uncertainty.
Crémer shows that the solution is a partition of the set of units that minimizes the variance of transfers between divisions. In other words, a good organizational structures groups together functions in a way that makes the interaction between divisions as predictable as possible. Crémer's result helps us identify organizational dilemmas. These are situations where there is no simple way of eliminating inter-division variance.
Question 2. How should managerial time and talent be allocated? Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1991) expand the analysis in Crémer (1980) by introducing managers. They study a hierarchy in which managers'role is to increase the amount of information brought to bear on each particular decision, but managers are limited in the amount of information they can collect. The questions they pose include: What are the key trade-o¤s determining the hierarchy structure? How is the organization a¤ected by uncertainty in the environment?
The objective of the organization is to allocate resources among units. The inputs and outputs are given by a multidimensional vector (we will do it in one dimension); the cost function is simply a quadratic form of those vectors. The problem is that the intercept of the cost function is unknown, only the slope is known. The managerial role is to decide how much to allocate to each unit, but only the allocation can be communicated. Each manager is told by her superior how many resources she gets, and tells that to subordinates. Managers aim to minimize expected total costs of their units. ; with " i N (0; s). The role of multiple managers is to bring more time to bear on decisions. The solution is obtained exactly in a team theoretical form: given information structure and organization, solve for the resource allocation; and then optimize over information structure given organization.
Among the implications of the analysis, they …nd that the number of managers is de-creasing in managerial wage, is increasing in the value of information, and follows an inverted (2000) consider a multi-unit …rm, where some pairs of units face an attribute matching problem (e.g. a car engine must …t the car body) and other pairs face an attribute compatibility problem (e.g. using the same transmission system on all cars yields a cost saving). Two possible structures are considered: in the M-form, units are grouped according to product lines; in the U-form they are grouped by functions. As in Crémer (1980) , units that are grouped together can share information more easily. The M-form facilitates attribute matching, while the U-form enhances attribute compatibility. Qian, Roland, and Xu characterize the terms of this trade-o¤. In particular, they show that the M-form is particularly useful when innovation is important as it allows for long-term small-scale experimentation.
The reason is that in the M-form, local managers can solve the attribute matching problems among complementary tasks but are less capable of achieving attribute compatibility across the organization, while in U-form organization, local managers can solve attribute compatibility more easily. Question 5. Centralization or decentralization? Error correction and robustness: In approving projects, allocating resources or launching new products, individuals make mistakes: they sometimes approve projects they should reject and they sometimes reject some they should accept. Organizations, by imposing extra checks on those decisions, may limit these errors, but they may introduce others. Taking that into account, organizations can be deliberately designed ex ante to complement limitations to human knowledge and judgement (Sah and Stiglitz 1986 ). 3 Athey, Avery and Zemsky (2000) give a di¤erent answer to the question of how much homogeneity is desirable by introducing type speci…c mentoring: higher level workers increase the productivity of those of their own type. On the other hand, a more homogeneous …rm loses out by passing on high quality people. Thus the trade-o¤ is the quality of workers versus amount of mentoring. As the …rm grows, can trace out di¤erent levels of homogeneity: if skill is scarce, …rms care less about homogeneity; on the other hand, if skill is plentiful but mentoring important -then …rms will be more homogeneous. With perfect screening, all good projects are accepted while the bad ones are rejected. Sah and Stiglitz (1986) consider two alternative screening systems: a polyarchy and a hierarchy (See Figure 1) . In a polyarchy, decision making is decentralized to multiple independent screens. So a project is accepted if it is approved by any evaluator. In a hierarchy, decision making is centralized to the top through successive screens. A project is accepted only if it passes all evaluators' screening. Note that there is no communication in a polyarchy as all evaluators work independently and make their decisions simultaneously. In a hierarchy, the communication between the evaluators is limited to a binary signal "Accept", "Reject". Implicitly the evaluators' decisions are substitutes under polyarchy and complements under hierarchy. With two evaluators, the probability that a project is approved is
s is the screening function that determines the probability that a project with underlying value z 'looks'good and is accepted. Immediately we can see that with the same screening criterion a polyarchy is more likely to accept the project than a hierarchy. In other words, the incidence of making type-II error is relatively high under polyarchy while the incidence of type-I error is relatively high under hierarchy.
These ideas illuminate the stylized fact that well-established …rms are not proli…c at innovating. Well established …rms want to protect their reputation and will be careful about the type of innovations they implement. The theory helps us illuminate how they do this:
by establishing hierarchies, so that approving new products in a mature …rm with a strong reputation will involve a highly bureaucratic process with numerous steps and procedures.
As a result, there is a high probability that good projects are rejected, and this is the price paid to avoid bad projects being accepted. Other examples may be an industry subject to a lot of public scrutiny or activities such as risk management where the loss is potentially large but gain is little. The …rst feature of the model is that a worker can handle more than one task. Tasks are partitioned across workers: assume for simplicity that all workers get the same number of tasks t. Let T (i) denote the set of tasks assigned to the worker in charge of task i. Every task is subject to an independent local source of uncertainty, x i , normally distributed with mean x i and variance 2 .
The team payo¤ is quadratic and takes the following form:
! (x; a 1 ; : : : ; a n ) =
The …rst element of the payo¤ function represents the bene…ts of adaptation. The primary action related to task i should be as close as possible to the local state x i . The second element captures the bene…ts of coordination across tasks. The outcome of task i depends on ancillary actions relating to other tasks, which should …t as closely as possible with the primary action. The third element represents returns from specialization: the cost h is increasing in the number of tasks that a worker has to handle, t. The three parameters, , , and , measure respectively the importance of adaptation, coordination, and specialization.
If agents had full information, the problem would have a simple solution: assign each task to one agent and set a ii = a ji = x i for all i and all j. However, it is more reasonable to assume that agents can only observe directly the local uncertainty that relates to the tasks they are assigned to. The second key feature of Dessein and Santos is that it introduces an explicit communication stage. The agent in charge of task i tries to convey x i to other agents. Transmission is successful with probability p. The sender does not know whether the message has gone through.
Given an organizational structure -de…ned by t -the optimal actions can be derived.
The primary action for task i is
while the ancillary action linked to task j is
These expressions yield a clean characterization of the terms of the trade-o¤ between adaptation and coordination. An increase in the importance of adaptation -higher -strengthens the link between the primary action a ii and the local state. In contrast, an increase in the need for coordination -higher -makes the primary action less variable.
Better communication -a higher p -dampens the trade-o¤ between adaptation and communication, allowing the primary action to track the local state and the ancillary action to track the primary action.
Task specialization, 1 t can now be endogenized, to maximize the expected organizational payo¤. Dessein and Santos identify a strategic complementarity between the need for adaptation, job breadth, and local uncertainty. It is shown that task specialization is decreasing in the importance of adaptation and the variance of local circumstances 2 . Having broad jobs facilitates coordination between primary and ancillary actions. Such coordination is most useful when primary actions are unpredictable, which in turn is due to the unpredictability of the local environment. Firms that face a lot of local uncertainty must forgo gains from specialization in order to achieve a better organizational response to the dual challenge of coordination and adaptation. To exchange information more e¤ectively, agents can create a shared organizational language. The cognitive cost is then measured by the complexity of the language that an agent has to learn. Finally, one can microfound problem-solving abilityhierarchies of knowledge -whereby agents must decide which pieces of knowledge to acquire at a cost that is increasing in the range of problems they can successfully tackle.
Endogenous communication: Hierarchies of processors
In our analysis of Geanakoplos and Milgrom's (1991) in the previous section we encountered an analysis of a decentralized hierarchy dealing with a resource allocation problem. There was no explicit information transfer beyond the allocation of resources by the superiors in the hierarchy to those below them. The role of decentralization was to bring more information to bear in decision making: since managerial time is limited, by creating a hierarchy we can have a manager who only allocates his attention to a subset of plants, and thus we can study those costs more carefully. The limitations on the information of each manager are, however,
exogenous. An extensive literature, associated with Timothy van Zandt and Roy Radner among others, has endogenized communication and information aggregation in organizations from …rst principles, starting from the raw data up.
All papers in this strand of the literature start with a decomposable associative operation (such as adding up, or …nding a maximum, among a set of numbers) and then allocates managers to process this problem in parallel. Agents in these networks read all of the primary data, or a report sent by others. In designing the network, the objectives may be to reduce delay, to minimize work load (the total time agents are busy), to minimize organizational size (number of agents) or to maximize throughput. The models generally rely on three parameters: the time it takes to perform associative operations, the time it takes to send data, and the time it takes to read data.
What are the costs and bene…ts of decentralization in terms of information processing?
By processing data in a decentralized way, organizations reduce delay, increase the rate of processing output, and allow specialization in di¤erent types of tasks. The costs of such networks are that they increase communication costs, and administrators'wasted time.
To understand this approach consider Radner (1993) , which sets up organizations to minimize delay, and assumes agents incur a …xed cost per message: each message can be transmitted in a period, independently of variable size. Radner shows that the optimal hierarchy has two properties (see the lower left tree in Figure 2 ). First, they are asymmetricin order to stay busy while those below process raw data, those above should also be involved in raw data processing. Second, and for the same reason, they involve skip-level reporting, so that even the very top manager is involved in reading and receiving messages. The reason is Figure 2: Optimal hierarchies to minimize total time, delay, and to maximize throughput (minimize frequency) under the assumption of Radner (1993) that processing a message takes 1 unit of time. The organization that minimizes delay is the one obtained by Radner (1993) ; the one that min. frequency is obtained by Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) . that this allows for using the time they would spend waiting for messages to arrive, minimizing delay.
Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) derive a more 'standard'looking hierarchy by maintaining the …xed and constant cost assumption but assuming that cohorts of data arrive all the time.
Agents can improve the rate of processing output by concentrating on some problems, and thus the objective is to maximize throughput. Figure 2 illustrates these two approaches
The best applications of these ideas take place in the more recent work of van Zandt who introduces decision making models where the delay costs are endogenous rather than given by a parameter. Speci…cally, the model takes place in a real time information processing setting, where agents must take decisions based on the information they process. In this world, more delay means decisions are based on stale information. In van Zandt (1999 Zandt ( , 2003 , the decision problem is a resource allocation problem in which the payo¤ functions change over time according to some stochastic process and the resource allocation decisions must take place in each period. This work may allow organizational theorists a deeper understanding of the relationship between information, uncertainty and organizational structure. For example, it is natural in this work that delayering takes place as the business environments gets more turbulent, since increasing turbulence makes decision making based on perfect aggregation of stale information particularly useless. Indeed, as Simon (1973) 
Endogenous communication: Organizational languages
Codes, which are a shared technical language between workers, form an important part of the communication infrastructure of …rms and organizations (Arrow 1974) . Miscoded knowledge may lead to ambiguity, confusion, misunderstanding and ine¢ ciency in communication and
production. An optimal design of codes needs to trade o¤ between specialization and commonality. On the one hand, a specialized code facilitates communication within a particular function that performs a task, but limits communication between functions that perform various tasks and thus makes coordination between tasks more costly. On the other hand, a broad common code improves coordination across tasks at the expense of less precise and more costly communication within tasks. In this subsection, we use a simpli…ed variant of Crémer, Garicano and Prat (2007) to explore the e¤ects of the attributes of tasks and the synergies between tasks on the design of codes and the interplay of optimal codes and organizational structure.
A team of two workers, worker 1 and worker 2, are employed to perform a task. As in the case of tacit knowledge and vertical communication, if worker 1 is not able to perform the task or solve the problem associated with the task, he can ask for help from worker 2.
However this kind of vertical communication is limited by two forms of bounded rationality.
First, both workers have a limited ability to learn codes which allow for the identi…cation of exact problems. Second, they have a limited ability to solve problems that involve incomplete information. An example would be a team that is composed of a salesman and an engineer to serve clients, who have problems with products or services. The salesman can classify problems raised by clients but not perfectly. The engineer and the salesman have to rely on a previously speci…ed and agreed code to transmit information coarsely. In order to make the intuition more transparent, we carry on this example to interpret the following model and use salesman for worker 1 and engineer for worker 2. The basic implications apply to many other tasks and occupations.
Task z is drawn from a distribution function F z with the probability density function f z on a set . That is clients approach salesmen with a problem that demands a solution z with probability f z > 0 from Z. The salesman, after reviewing the problem, selects a message from a code and transmits it to the engineer. Formally, a code C is a partition f 1 ; 2 ; :::; K g of the set ; where the subscript of the s represents a word k that gives the information that the problem z belongs to the subset k . The breath of word k is n k ; the number of of events that k contains when is …nite or the 'size'(the Lebesgue measure) of k when is a continuum.
For simplicity, we normalize the …rm's pro…t from solving a client's problem to 1 and its target is just to minimize the expected 'miscommunication' or diagnosis cost between the salesman and the engineer, de…ned as
where p k is the frequency of a word k being sent. The per unit miscommunication cost, which can be regarded as the 'diagnosis cost' of the problem, depends on the precision of the information (the breath of word) sent by the salesman. It is natural to assume that the cost is increasing in the breath of k as less precise information brings about more costly communication. This simple speci…cation leads to some intuitive results: a code should use precise words for frequent events and vaguer words for more unusual ones; a more unequal distribution of events increases the value of the creation of a specialized code, since the precision of the words can be more tightly linked to the characteristics of the environment.
The following two-word-code example illustrates the main ideas (the reader should refer to the paper for the analysis in the general case). Suppose that a salesman deals with problem
a measure of the evenness of the distribution. At b = 0, the distribution is uniform and the distribution becomes more uneven when b deviates more from 0. We also assume that codes can have at most two words, K = 2, and that the diagnosis cost is linear in the breath of word. Denoting with F the cumulative distribution function, the optimal code problem is:
This optimization yields a unique cuto¤ b z that splits the set into two words: . A more precise code is used to deal with more frequent problems. It can be shown that b z deviates further from 1 2 when jbj deviates more from 0, which implies that a more specialized code is adopted when the distribution of problems is more unequal.
Integration and Separation As we have seen, optimal codes are designed to facilitate vertical communication between workers that perform the same tasks within the same organization unit. In many situations, communication is horizontal and takes place between people that perform di¤erent tasks in di¤erent working units. Then tailoring codes to the needs of particular agents in an organizational unit may be costly as it limits the set of agents among whom the codes are useful. The design of optimal codes needs to take into account the possible synergies across tasks and organization units. Two organizational units that face similar tasks will not …nd a common code too costly and should therefore be integrated through the same code.
We extend the simple two-word-code model discussed above to allow two services or functional units A and B. Each of them is composed of one salesman and one engineer.
We focus on two possible organizational forms as shown in Figure 3 Each engineer has the ability to attend to the needs of at most one client. Salesmen bring sales leads randomly to each engineer. The arrival process is as follows:
0 with probability p, is arriving, it is quite likely that either none or 2 will arrive. Thus p measures the importance of the synergy between the two services: a high p means that the services are likely to need to share clients, while a low p means that each service is likely to have its capacity fully utilized. 4 The pro…t of the …rm when it solves a client's problem is 1. The per-client diagnosis costs is ': if the engineer knows that the client's characteristics fall in an interval of size s, his diagnosis cost is s'. We assume that the diagnosis cost is su¢ ciently high to ensure that information must transit through a salesman before being sent to an engineer (' > 1) but not so high that pro…t risks becoming negative (' < 2).
An integrated organization requires that a salesman from service unit A explain to an engineer in B the needs of his customer. Such a cross-unit explanation requires a common code in both services. It is intuitive that the common language is the one that would be chosen when the density of tasks is the average of the two densities of the two services. 5 In this simple example, since both services have opposing distributions, the average problem density is uniform. The optimal code has two equally imprecise words, with each word identifying the sales lead as coming from one half of the distribution. The total pro…ts are: 6
In a separated organization, where the two services use di¤erent codes, the expected pro…t is:
The organization should be integrated rather than separated if the between service improvement in communication (measured by the synergy gain) is larger than the within service loss in precision due to the worsening of the code used:
The result characterizes the determinants of the trade-o¤ between separate, well-adapted codes optimized for within-service communication, and broader common codes that allow for between-service communication. Separate codes are preferable when synergies p are relatively low, when the underlying probability distributions confronting the di¤erent units are su¢ ciently di¤erent(b is high), or when diagnosis costs (') are high so that there is a high premium on communicating precisely. As a result, increases in synergies, in the equality of the distributions or decreases in diagnosis costs increase code commonality.
Translator and Hierarchy An alternative to integration to exploit the synergy between two distinct units is to introduce a hierarchical superior as a translator, who enables services with di¤erent codes to cooperate. For instance, if salesman A has two customers, he communicates to the translator the type of the "extra" customer in the code used in service A. The translator will search for z, and then he will transmit the information to engineer B in the code used in service B. (Panel C in Figure 3 ).
Assume that hiring a translator requires incurring a …xed cost ; since the translator is specialized in language, her diagnosis cost is lower than that of the engineers. The optimal organization choice depends crucially on communication costs and the translator's advantage.
Hierarchies are more e¢ cient when communication costs are high, whereas low communication costs favor their replacement by common codes and horizontal communication. Consider 5 For a formal proof, see Corollary 1 in Cremer, Garicano and Prat (2007) . 6 The probability that a problem is solved is the sum of 1) 1 2p, the probability that only one problem arrives and is passed to the engineer within the same unit; 2) p, the probability that two problems arrive and one is always passed to the engineer within the same unit; 3) p 2 , the probability that two problems arrive and one is passed to the engineer in other unit that has no problem arriving. The theory of optimal codes helps us understand the relationship between decentralization and information technology which has been widely discussed both in the economics literature and in the business press. Accounting systems, human resource and other organizational databases are codes in Arrow's (1974) sense. In recent years, the management of these codes within …rms has become more centralized, while communications have become less hierarchical and while, at the same time, decision making has become more decentralized. Robert J.
Herbold, Chief Operating O¢ cer for Microsoft from 1994 to 2001, described this apparent paradox as follows: "standardizing speci…c practices and centralizing certain systems also provided, perhaps surprisingly, bene…ts usually associated with decentralization."This paradox re ‡ects the rationale behind the theory: better management of communication codes substitutes bureaucracies and allows for decentralization.
Endogenous knowledge acquisition
Under cognitive costs, individuals choose not to acquire all the available knowledge. In fact the decision of how much knowledge to acquire involves an expectation of both how useful this knowledge is and the extent to which other individuals may be called upon for help.
In this case, organizations are useful because they allow individuals to bring to bear more knowledge, thereby leveraging the knowledge of multiple individuals in solving problems. A recent literature has tackled this issues, and thus allows us to explore the role of organization members as problem solvers, as was suggested in the March and Simon (1958, p 25) remark quoted in the introduction.
Essentially, the key advantage of organization is that it allows for an increase in the utilization rate of knowledge. While a particular piece of knowledge may be too unusual to be acquired by an individual, individuals working together will …nd it in their interest to do so. Of course, this is the key force for specialization in the horizontal division of labor sense, and often takes place without organization-we do, after all, have doctors and lawyers selling their wares in the market.
Organization, however, may be needed when knowledge is tacit and thus problems hard to presort, or identify ex ante. In this case, a hierarchy allows for the matching of problems with the right experts, as Garicano (2000) shows.
Following Garicano (2000), we de…ne a random variable Z as the knowledge content of a task, which also indicates the problem that the worker will confront when performing the task.
Let
R + be the set of all possible problems and A be the set of problems that a worker is able to solve, referred to as his "knowledge set". When production starts, a problem Z 2 is drawn from an a priori known distribution F , referred to as the "knowledge distribution" of a task. The problem is solved and the task is completed if the realized knowledge content is within the worker's knowledge set, namely, Z 2 A.
In this single task production workers acquire knowledge to solve problems. , where c is a constant. The expected output x of a worker is 1 (the value of a completed project) multiplied by the probability that he has the knowledge to complete the project. Without loss of generality, we can re-order problems so that f (:) is downward sloping; then the argument in f indexes the frequency of the problems. For a continuous and nonatomic F; a worker in autarchy confronting such a production function and knowledge distribution of a task maximizes expected net output y:
The optimality condition is simply 7
which equates the marginal value of acquiring knowledge to the marginal cost: he learns those problems which are 'common enough' to justify investing in them. 8 The worker's optimal knowledge level is z and his knowledge set is [0; z ].
When knowledge is tacit, it is hard to formalize, express, store and transfer in some form of code. In order to solve a problem, workers need to discuss, clarify and check the information encompassed in the problem to be solved, irrespective of whether they know the answer or Consider a simple organization with n + 1 team members to carry out production that involves problem solving as before. There are two organizational alternatives: a one-layer structure in which all members devote their time to production and a two-layer structure with n production workers and 1 manager who can help the workers to solve problems. Suppose the workers perform the same task independently. The one-layer organization acquires knowledge to maximize their output
By the assumption of identical and independent distribution and the linear cost function, the optimal condition is reduced to the …rst order condition: f (z i ) = c. .
In a two-layer organization, there is a manager who may acquire more knowledge and spend time helping production workers who cannot deal with their own problem due to the limitation of their knowledge. However, help incurs communication costs: it takes time for a worker to propose a question and for a manager to …gure out a solution. For simplicity, we assume that a request from a worker incurs a …xed helping cost h, which is proportional to the production time of the worker and borne only by the receiver for notational simplicity.
Then the organization's target is to 7 Assuming that learning something is worth it, that is as long as f (0) > c.
Subject to are the knowledge level acquired by each worker and the manager respectively. As a result,
is the manager's time devoted to production and t h m to helping workers. Compared to (??), the two-layer organization allows for a division of labor and maybe more knowledge acquisition. The manager plays a key role in this process: she is able to leverage her knowledge -it will be worthwhile to learn unusual problems, since she can use it to answer questions from an entire team. But this advantage comes with two costs. One is the cost of acquiring additional knowledge. The other is that helping others competes away her time for production. The communication cost can be seen from the constraints.
The …rst constraint says that the overall time for the manager is limited to a normalized unit. Since time is always valuable, this constraint will bind at optimum. The second constraint is essentially an identity that equates the communication time from both sides of the communicators (time answering questions must be equal to time asking questions)
In the optimum, t p m = 0 and t h m = 1. That is the manager completely specializes in problem solving. This is because if it pays to spend the …rst fraction of time leveraging time to help some workers then it is pro…table to spend all other units of time in helping and not producing. Then the objective function is reduced to max R 2 (z m ; z w ; n) = nF (z m ) cnz w cz m subject to
The solution is pinned down by the conditions:
Here we assume that the manager needs to know the worker's knowledge in order to solve the problem. The analysis applies to the case in which the knowledge sets of the manager and workers are not overlapping. The bene…t of hierarchy is that it allows the manager to leverage his knowledge in problem solving ( F (z m )) by combining it with the time of less knowledgeable workers, so that the team solves more problems; the cost is that the number of problems tackled is lower than in autarchy (n+1>n), since 1 unit of time (the manager's time endowment) is spent in communication.
From the …rst line in (4), the optimal knowledge level in the two-layer organization is higher than in the one-layer organization: the marginal value of manager knowledge is larger, as it is spread over n workers. This is exactly the e¤ect of knowledge leverage which allows for specialization and a higher knowledge level. Second, given that f (z m ) is decreasing in z m , a more knowledgeable manager attains a larger span of control. Third, the number of workers increase in the knowledge they acquire since a more knowledgeable worker asks fewer questions and gives more time to other workers. A comparison of the hierarchical production and the production absent of hierarchy is illustrated in Figure 3 .
A full model without restrictions on the number of layers is developed in Garicano (2000) .
In this model, a knowledge hierarchy e¢ ciently integrates tacit knowledge. Members in the organization specialize either in production or in solving problems and only one class specializes in production (referred to as production workers). Those who specialize in problem solving are managers allocated at the higher level of the hierarchy. Production workers learn to solve the most common problems; managers or problem solvers learn the exceptions. The higher is a member in the hierarchy, the more unusual the problems she is able to solve.
Moreover the organization has a pyramidal structure, each layer possessing a smaller size than the previous one.
Knowledge hierarchies allow more knowledgeable workers to specialize in exceptional problems. This "management by exception" was well stated by Alfred Sloan (1924, P. 195 ), who in describing his job, claimed that "we do not do much routine work with details. They never get up to us. I work fairly hard, but it is on exceptions..., not on routine or petty details. 
Bringing Together Incentives and Cognition
A recent stream of research in organizational economics attempts to combine incentive theory and team theory. We focus on two new developments: a set of papers that introduces incentives in the classical team-theoretic coordination problem and a literature that studies costly communication under moral hazard.
The multi-tasking literature …rst observed the existence of a trade-o¤ between coordination and motivation and argued that if incentives are endogenous one may expect that low-powered incentives may be optimal (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991, 1994 ), Holmstrom Essentially, like in team theoretical models in the past, information is distributed but unlike there, it can be communicated, at a cost. Speci…cally, the limit to communication is that managers are biased and thus not truthful.
Adopting Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek's (2008) notation, there are two production units, each of which has the pro…t function: With these elements in place, we can now study the e¤ect of organizational structure. In a decentralized structure, decisions are given, for example for manager 1; by:
Alternatively, both managers can send messages to a "central"manager, who is assumed to be unbiased but uninformed a priori. In this case, he will solve:
Given this set up, one can now analyze the impact of coordination on organizational 
where " s ij is a normally distributed variable with precision (1/variance) s ij , which represents the noise under the control of sender j, and " r ij is another normally distributed variable with precision r ij , which represents the noise due to the receiver i. Precise communication is costly on both ends. The sender j pays cost k 2 s s ij to achieve precision s ij . The receiver i pays k 2 r r ij to achieve precision r ij , where k 2 s and k 2 r are parameters. The payo¤ function of each agent is quadratic:
where the terms of the form d ii measure the importance of adaptation while the terms of the form d ij capture the need for agent j to coordinate with agent i, which may di¤er from the need for i to coordinate with j.
In this two-stage model, …rst all agents select communication intensities s ij and r ij , then, after observing signal realizations, they choose actions a i . The model admits a linear solution:
The main technical contribution is to …nd a close-form expression for the in ‡uence coe¢ cients b ij , which measure how much the action a i selected by agent i is in ‡uenced by the signal y ij sent by j, as well as one for the communication intensities s ij and r ij . For any organizational objective (a matrix of interaction coe¢ cients d ij ), one can determine the equilibrium in ‡uence structure and the equilibrium communication structure.
As we shall see in the next section, predictions on s ij and r ij are testable by using data on electronic communication within organizations.
For instance, the result can be used to analyze equilibrium communication in a matrix form organization. For concreteness, interpret agents as units of a multinational …rm. Suppose that every i is associated to two attributes: function f i and country c i . There are n f functions and n c countries, so there are a total of n f n c units. Assume that
Communication will be more intense on dimensions where interactions are stronger. So, if C > F , we will see more communication within a country than within a function. More importantly, the model can be used to see what happens when units are grouped into divisions.
In Crémer (1980) , if two units belonged to the same division they would communicate for free. Here, instead, grouping has no direct e¤ect on communication technology: it only means that those units share the same payo¤, namely they become part of the same team.
If, for instance, we group country functions together, we obtain two e¤ects. As expected, an important organizational decision: whenever we o¤er a collective incentive to a set of agents, we foster team work between them but we also push them apart from the rest of the organization. In other words, there exists a trade-o¤ between the cohesion of a speci…c division and its integration within the …rm at large.
The foundations and implications of bounded rationality
In this …nal section we identify some recent developments -ranging from purely theory to data availability -that we see as crucial for the research agenda in the future. First, researchers have tried to get better microfoundations for cognitive costs. Second, recent research aims to go beyond understanding organizations, by building organizations into models of labor markets. Richer views of …rms, if useful, should contribute to better understanding of markets.
Finally, we study how the recent ‡ood of data internal to organizations, including email, personnel data etc. allows for direct testing of theories that, up to know, where hard to test.
Modeling Cognitive Costs
If cognitive limits lie at the core of models of organization, it is important that the way we model such limits is consistent, general and well-documented. Since Alan Turing's work, computer science has developed ways to think about various limits to information processing.
The key concept is that of complexity class. Problems are categorized depending on the amount of resources necessary to solve them, given the best known algorithms. This means that the complexity notion depends on the type of resource that we are focusing on.
The most widespread notion is that of computational complexity (e.g. Papadimitriou 1994). The resource under consideration is computation time, which is proportional to the number of basic operations that a Turing machine should perform in order to solve the problem. A literature has developed at the intersection of economics and computer science to study mechanism design from a computational complexity viewpoint. This area, often referred to as algorithmic mechanism design (for a survey see Nisan, Roughgarden, Tardos, and Vazirani 2007, Chapter 2), is quite active but it has tended to focus on a di¤erent set of problems, mostly related to auctions and competitive allocation mechanisms.
While computational complexity is central to computer science, it has not yet had an impact on organizational economics. One possible reason for the lack of intellectual arbitrage is that computational complexity focuses mainly on …nding exact solutions -or excellent approximations -to di¢ cult but well-de…ned problems, like the traveling salesman's problem.
Unfortunately, this approach does not appear to capture, even at a stylized level, the sort of challenges that …rms face, and have therefore found virtually no application in organizational
economics.
An alternative de…nition of complexity has found wider application in issues of interest In a Hayekian view, we are looking for ways to optimize the process of aggregating dispersed knowledge. 10 Segal (1995) uses communication complexity to understand coordination by authority.
Consider two agents who must agree on a joint action from a …nite set A. Each agent i observes a signal from the set i. . There is no con ‡ict of interest between the agents. They both want to select the optimal action given their joint information. However, the agents However, Segal proves a negative result. Let the size of a problem be n = jAj. A protocol is of polynomial complexity if, for some and k, its communication burden can be bounded above by n k for all n. Segal identi…es a class of problems such that the additional expected payo¤ generated by moving from coordination by authority to any protocol of polynomial complexity tends to 0 as n ! 1.
In the class of problems used to prove this result, a joint action is 'good'if both agents receive a positive signal about it. If at least one of the agents receives a negative signal, the action is bad. If one assumes that signals are independent and that the proportion (but not the expected number) of good actions goes to zero as n ! 1, then …nding a good action requires a great deal of communication. When an agent describes an action for which he received a positive signal, the probability that that particular action is also positive for the other agent goes to zero. That is true for any …nite set of actions. Hence, to do better than coordination by authority, agents must be prepared to describe an in…nite number of actions. The theorem implies that asymptotically the only way to improve on coordination by authority is to use protocols that are exponential in the size of the problem n, making the communication burden potentially unsustainable.
To understand the economic intuition behind the theorem, it is important to keep in mind two underlying assumptions. First, the class of problems used to prove the negative result agents can allocate their time between production and monitoring. The authors characterize the optimal organizational arrangement in the presence of these cognitive constraints. Unlike in traditional settings, agents, especially those with highly uncertain tasks, make empty promises -namely they do not ful…ll commitments to undertake certain tasks and they are not punished.
A related form of bounded rationality relates to categorization, which can be measured in terms of the number of states that an automaton needs to implement a certain procedure.
This notion has found application in repeated games (Rubinstein 1986) and more recently as a way of assessing the cognitive requirements of di¤erent choice rules (Salant 2010) . A choice procedure yields a bene…t in terms of payo¤ from the alternative chosen and a cost in terms of state complexity. The optimal procedure may display dynamic framing e¤ects, such history dependency and a recency e¤ect.
Finally, as mentioned above, a fundamental feature of the set of problems that …rms face is that they are ill-de…ned. As March and Simon (1958, p 190) noted: "Because of the limits of human intellective capacities in comparison with the complexities of the problems that individual and organizations face, rational behavior calls for simpli…ed models that capture the main features of a problem without capturing all its complexities." Firms use simpli…ed and potentially incorrect representations of the environment in which they operate.
As they realize that there may be a discrepancy between model and reality, they look for 1 1 Communication complexity has also been used to study the hold-up problem (Segal 1999). The kind of contracts that can prevent ine¢ cient outcomes due to the ex-post renegotiation (Maskin and Moore 1999) require a large communication burden as the number of possible contingencies increases. In a complex environment, the parties'inability to foresee all possible trades ex ante combined with the cost of describing them ex post makes it di¢ cult to eliminate the hold-up problem.
organizational solutions that tolerate a certain degree of model misspeci…cation.
Maradasz and Prat (2010) explore an example of organizational response to model uncertainty. They re-visit the classical screening problem under the assumption that the …rm operates on the basis of a simpli…ed model of the true distribution of types. The authors show that mechanisms that are optimal when the …rm knows the true distribution can perform very poorly when the …rm uses an approximate type space, even as the model converges to the truth. Instead, the authors identify a class of mechanisms that yield a near-optimal payo¤ even if when they are based on an approximate type space. In Simon's terminology, these mechanisms can be seen as satis…cing rather than optimal: they achieve an outcome that is adequate even if the model is slightly misspeci…ed. 
Putting Firms into Labor Markets
An area where the organization models we have reviewed have great potential is the study of the interdependence of labor market and …rm structure. It is clear that changes in wages and wage inequality are a function of the internal restructuring of …rms: as the division of tasks between managers and workers change, the returns to skill change. Similarly, the optimal organization of …rms responds to changes in wage schedule, the extent and cost of o¤shoring and other market equilibrium phenomena. Embedding optimally organized …rms inside markets is a challenge for which the theories we have reviewed are well suited.
Speci…cally, if organizations are devices that aim to leverage the knowledge of multiple individuals to solve problems (as in Garicano, 2000) , then changes in how individuals communicate and how costly they …nd it to solve problems will a¤ect not only how these individuals are organized, but also the return to their skills and thus their wages. That is, wages are not just a¤ected by human capital and productivity, but by the coordination and communication costs among individuals. Consistent with the theory, they …nd that cheaper information access decentralizes-as more information is available, people become generalists and need less help; while cheaper commu-nication centralizes, as people specialize more and need more help, they rely more on experts, on stars, and on knowledge and information located at corporate headquarters. This clearly has implications for the labor market, which are analyzed by Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) (GRH).
GRH develop a competitive model of the labor market with workers with heterogeneous cognitive ability. Recall from the treatment in 3.3 that, given a density of problems confronted f (:) ; a worker with knowledge z can solve a fraction F (z) of problems; that he needs help with probability 1 F (z); that helping him costs h (1 F (z) ) where h is the cost of communication or helping; and thus that a manager who is matched with workers with knowledge z can help n = 1=(h (1 (F (z) ) workers. GRH assume that the helping or communication cost h is equal for all workers, but that di¤erent workers can learn how to solve problems at a di¤erent cost-speci…cally, smarter workers are those who incur a lower cost of learning to learn the same interval of problems. They specify the cost of acquiring knowledge a as a function of skill and technology , so that the cost of acquiring knowledge z is a( ; t)z and comparative (and absolute) advantage holds: high ability types have a comparative advantage in knowledge acquisition. This allows for a study of the impact of communication and information acquisition cost on wages, inequality and organization. The problem is solved in two stages: for a given set of wages and assignment, the organization of the …rm (given by knowledge acquisition, spans of control and layers) must be optimal. Then the equilibrium in the labor market is obtained, in which (1) Agents choose occupations to maximize utility; (2) …rms choose the skill of their employees, their knowledge, and their number; (3) …rms make zero pro…ts and (4) labor markets clear, that is, the matching of workers to managers is such that supply and demand are equalized at every point of the skill distribution.
Among the …ndings of the analysis, GRH show that when information technology reduces the cost of acquiring information, individuals gain more autonomy, the number of layers of organization decrease, and wage inequality increases primarily within occupational classes.
In this world being a bit more skilled makes workers a bit better o¤. The implications of better communication technology are di¤erent. Those who use this technology to leverage their knowledge, managers and experts, are better o¤, as they can leverage it more; while those who rely on others acquire less knowledge as a result and are worse o¤. Communication technology thus results in an increase in wage inequality between occupational classes.
A similar, although slightly simpler, framework can be used to study the implications of o¤shoring. The key feature of o¤shoring is that it allows the formation of cross-country tradesit thus allows for matches across di¤erent countries. To study the impact of o¤shoring on the labor market and the organization of …rms, Antras, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) propose a model where the distribution of problem solving knowledge in the population z is exogenously given; the distribution of skills in the population is given by a cumulative distribution function G (z) ; with density g (z) : Equilibrium is similar to GRH, except that now knowledge acquisition is exogenous. where the "North"has more skills and thus can specialize in problem solving and the "South" specializes in production . For example, they conclude that when technology permits the pairing of low skilled workers from the South with high skilled workers from the North, withinworker inequality increases in the South as a result of changes in matching: globalization improves the quality of the managers with whom southern workers are matched, thus raising the productivity of these workers, and thereby leading to an increase in their marginal return to skill. This e¤ect is reinforced by an occupational choice e¤ect: more agents become workers, hence increasing the range of abilities in the worker skill distribution.
They also show that organizational forces imply that the e¤ect in the North is less clear.
On the one hand, we have a traditional labor market e¤ect: low skill workers in the North face increased competition from southern workers and this tends to reduce their marginal return to skill. On the other hand, organization plays a key role: when more low skill agents are available, the time of high skill managers becomes more scarce, and workers who are better able to economize on this time become relatively more valuable. As a result, the value of more skilled workers relative to less skilled ones increases, as does the di¤erence between the ability of the managers they are matched with. When either communication costs or the skill overlap are su¢ ciently low, so that high skill managers are particularly valuable and scarce, this last e¤ect dominates and globalization increases wage inequality not only in the South but also in the North.
Interpreting Activity Data
The cognitive costs discussed in this survey have a strong temporal dimension. Communicating or processing information takes time. If we can observe how agents allocate their time (activity data), we can make inferences on the cognitive costs they incur. This means that organizational theories based on cognitive costs have a potentially large empirical relevance.
For instance, in Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1991) , managers choose how to allocate their limited time to di¤erent tasks. Their model makes a rich set of predictions on time allocation, compensation, and performance -all variables that are potentially testable.
Traditionally, activity data was hard to obtain. An ethnographic study was needed to record how workers spent their time. The presence of an outside observer was both costly an intrusive. However, the IT revolution has made the collection of activity data much simpler.
How organization members spend their time can be gleaned from email data, calendaring software, social networks, etc. The vector describes the value of the top manager's time in all possible activities and it is determined by the …rm technology and environment.
The CEO can also produce some personal rent (e.g. networking), with production function
The vector depends on characteristics of the CEO and the institutional and economic environment he operates in.
The total cost of time for the CEO is C = It is easy to see that the optimal time allocation satis…eŝ
In the extreme case of perfect alignment (b = 1), the CEO devotes time to activities in proportion to the relative value of the activities to the …rm:
More generally, the relative allocation of time across activities will be determined both by the …rm's needs and by the CEO's preferences. To put some structure on the problem, assume that activities can be grouped into two sets: I Y and I R . The …rst set -let's call elements of I Y productive activities -contains activities that bene…ts the …rm but not the CEO ( i > 0 and i = 0), while the second one contains activities -networking activitiesthat are only bene…cial to the CEO ( i = 0 and i > 0). This leads to three sets of testable implications:
1. In equilibrium, the cross-sectional correlation between the timex i that the CEO devotes to a particular activity and the total time the CEO spends at work is positive if and only if the activity is productive.
2. In equilibrium, the cross-sectional correlation between the timex i that the CEO devotes to an activity i and …rm's productivityŶ is positive if and only if activity i is productive.
3. The governance measureb is positively correlated with time spent on an activity if and only that activity is productive.
Bandiera, Guiso, Prat and Sadun (2009) combine the activity data discussed above as well as standard data on …rm's performance and governance. Such information, given the three predictions above, can be used to understand the relative productivity of di¤erent activities.
In particular, there is a debate over whether CEOs devote time to activities outside the …rm Of course, there is no guarantee that this email-based measure will work in practice. So,
Palacios-Huerta and Prat use a database of email tra¢ c between all top executives in a large
Spanish retail company to determine how this index correlated with actual organizational outcomes. The impact factor of an executive -computed uniquely on the basis of email data -turns out to be strongly correlated with: (i) the executive's rank in the corporation (the agent with the highest factor is the CEO and nowhere in the company a subordinate has a higher factor than his boss); (ii) the executive's salary (controlling for rank); (iii) the chance that he will be promoted or dismissed (a positive/negative deviation from the impact factor predicted by the executive's rank and salary is predictive of that executive being promoted/dismissed in the future).
Conclusions
In the past three decades, organizational economists have almost entirely focused on how We have also identi…ed three external stimuli that are a¤ecting the economic study of organizations. First, computer science and other disciplines are providing powerful and coherent ways to model cognitive costs. Second, other disciplines within economics -especially labor economics, industrial organization, and international trade -feel an increasing need to enrich and re…ne their theoretical predictions by opening up the 'black box'of organizations.
Third, the availability of activity data will make it easier for economists to quantify what happens within …rms and to test competing organizational theories.
